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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20000589-CA

vs.
MARK ANTHONY MERLEN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)
(Supp. 1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion
to suppress where the officer merely investigated a solitary vehicle in an empty parking lot
which, upon illuminating the scene, the officer immediately recognized as a truck he
observed just a few days earlier with expired California license plates.
Standard of Review. The trial court's factual findings on a motion to suppress are
reviewed for clear error and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. State v.
Swink, 2000 UT App 262, f 6, 11 P.3d 299; State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998).

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to a
determination of this case. That amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, one count of unlawful possession of
a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence seized in a search of his person incident to arrest. R. 15. After an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R. 51: 47. * Defendant subsequently entered a
guilty plea to a reduced charge of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, and the court dismissed the remaining counts. See R. 27-38. In entering the
guilty plea, defendant reserved the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on defendant's

1

A transcript of the trial court's ruling at the evidentiary hearing is reproduced in
Addendum A.
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motion to suppress. R. 27. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of
zero-to-five years, running concurrently with a prison term on another matter he was then
serving. R. 36. Defendant timely appealed. R. 42-43.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

Officer Tracy Allred of the Price City Police Department was on patrol on Christmas
Eve 1999. See R. 51:8. Some time after midnight, now Christmas morning, Officer Allred
performed a security check of the north ballpark complex. R. 51: 9, 19. Officers were
instructed to perform the security check because of incidents of criminal mischief, drug
usage, and underage drinking. R. 51: 9. As he did so, Officer Allred observed a truck
backed into a parking stall in the main parking lot east of the complex. R. 51: 9,20. Officer
Allred made a left turn, checked the west end of the complex, and turned around. R. 51: 9.
As he again passed the east side of the complex, the truck was still there. R. 51: 9.
The presence of the lone truck in the parking lot at that early hour raised the officer's
concerns. R. 51: 10. He had prior experience with juveniles drinking and smoking
marijuana at that particular location. R. 51: 10. He was also concerned given the increased
incidents of suicide during the holiday season. R. 51: 10. Prompted by these concerns,
Officer Allred pulled into the parking lot, and, for safety reasons, stopped his patrol car at
a 45 degree angle facing the truck—the right front of the officer's car at the right front of
defendant's truck. R. 51:10,20. The officer activated his flood lights, but did not block the
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truck. R. 51: 10, 21-22, 25.2 When he stopped, Officer Allred recognized the truck as one
that he had seen a few days earlier bearing a California licence plate with an expired 1997
registration. R. 51: 10. Officer Allred then notified dispatch of his location and requested
a check of the license plate number. See R. 51: 10-11. As he did so, he noticed defendant
sitting in the passenger side of the truck making a lot of movement with his hands as if he
were putting something down in front of his pants or down his pants. R. 51: 11. Officer
Allred also noticed that the truck engine was running. R. 51: 11.
Officer Allred exited his patrol car and walked up to the passenger window. R. 51:
11. As he did so, he observed some beer cartons and empty beer cans in the back of the
truck. R. 51: 11. Officer Allred asked defendant through the open truck window "what was
goin' on." R. 51: 11,19. Defendant told him that he had "just c[ome] into town relaxing/'
R. 51: 12. Officer Allred pointed to the beer cartons in the back of the truck and asked him
if he had been drinking. R. 51:12. Defendant responded in the negative, explaining that the
beer cartons were from his work. R. 51: 12. During this conversation, Officer Allred's
initial concerns that defendant may have been impaired or using illicit drugs were dispelled.
R. 51:23-24. He did not smell any alcohol or observe any evidence of impairment, drug use,
or other criminal activity. R. 51: 12, 22-24.
Because Officer Allred "wanted to talk to [defendant] more, [he] asked him to shut
the engine off." R. 51: 12, 22. After defendant complied with the request, Officer Allred
2

The flood lights, which Officer Allred referred to as "take down lights," are used
to shine into a vehicle's window so the officer can observe the vehicle's occupants. See
R. 51:22,25.
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asked him "why he was movin' around like he was hidin' something." R. 51:12. Defendant
explained that he was "just zippin' up the zipper of his pants." R. 51: 12. Officer Allred
then told defendant the reason he came over to speak with him—that it was suspicious for
him to be there at one o'clock early Christmas morning. R. 51: 12. Officer Allred asked
defendant for his driver's license, whereupon defendant produced a Utah driver's license.
R. 51: 12-13,19. Defendant explained that he and his brother were from Utah, but they had
been working in California and Salt Lake City. R. 51: 13. He admitted that the registration
had expired, but claimed he bought a temporary sticker. R. 51: 13, 23. However, Officer
Allred could not confirm the validity of the temporary sticker because it was too faded to
read. R. 51: 13.
Officer Allred asked dispatch for a warrants check, but before he received a response
from dispatch, defendant admitted that he had an outstanding warrant. R. 51: 13. Dispatch
subsequently confirmed that defendant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest out of
Draper. R. 51: 13-14. After confirming again the existence of the warrant, Officer Allred
told defendant to step out of the truck. R. 51: 14. After removing the ignition keys,
defendant exited the truck. R. 51: 14. Officer Allred handcuffed defendant, searched him,
and placed him under arrest. R. 51: 14. By this time, a second officer arrived at the scene.
R. 51: 14. When given the option of having the truck impounded for safekeeping or leaving
it there at the parking lot, defendant asked that it be left in the parking lot. R. 51:14. Officer
Allred transported defendant to the jail and the second officer remained at the scene to secure
the truck. R. 51: 14-15.
5

At the jail, Officer Allred searched defendant, finding a small ziplock bag containing
methamphetamine in the front pocket of defendant's jacket. See R. 51: 15. When Officer
Allred left to speak with dispatch, another officer stayed with defendant. R. 51: 15. That
officer found marijuana and paraphernalia on defendant's person. See R. 1,51: 15.3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Officer Allred's initial approach to defendant's truck did not constitute a seizure. He
approached the truck openly late at night. He did not block the truck, nor did he otherwise
display a show of authority. Activation of his patrol car's flood lights was for the purpose
of illuminating the area. A reasonable person would not believe, under the circumstances of
the late hour and empty parking lot, that he or she was being detained. Once the officer
recognized the truck as one he had seen just a few days earlier with expired California license
plates, he had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop. The warrants check
verified defendant's admission that he had an outstanding warrant and justified the arrest and
subsequent search.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT WAS NOT SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
After taking evidence, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. R. 51:
47. The trial court concluded that neither the manner in which Officer Allred parked his car,

3

What that officer found was not disclosed at the suppression hearing because it
was not necessary to a determination of the motion. See R. 51: 15-18. The information
indicates, however, that marijuana and drug paraphernalia were found. See R. 1.
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nor his use of flood lights rendered the encounter a seizure. R. 51: 41-42. The court further
concluded that reasonable suspicion justified a stop as soon as Officer Allred recognized the
truck as one he had seen just a few days earlier with expired California license plates. R. 51:
42. A review of the applicable law reveals that the trial court's conclusions were correct.
A.

CITIZEN-POLICE ENCOUNTERS.

Three levels of police encounters with the public are constitutionally permissible:
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a
person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed."
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) {quoting United States v. Merritt, 736
F.2d 223,230 (5th Cir. 1984)) (other internal quotations omitted); accord Salt Lake City v.
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 10, 998 P.2d 274. "Characterization of the encounter... must be
determined by examining the totality of the circumstances." State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879,
881 (Utah App. 1989); accord Ray, 2000 UT App 55, at 113.
Consensual Encounters, A level-one encounter involves "situations where an officer
approaches an individual and poses questions to the individual, so long as the individual is
not detained against his will." State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App. 1991), cert.
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); accord Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,434,111 S.Ct.
2382,2386 (1991). In other words, "mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure."
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434,111 S.Ct. at 2386. Level-one encounters "are not seizures subject
7

to Fourth Amendment protection." State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994);
accord Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. at 2386 (holding that a voluntary citizen-police
encounter "will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual
nature").
Investigatory Stops. "In contrast, a level two stop, or a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, occurs when the officer 'by means of physical force or show of
authority has in some way restrained the liberty' of a person." Bean, 869 P.2d at 986.
{quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19n.l6,88 S.Ct. 1868,1899 n.16 (1968)) (other internal
quotes omitted). These seizures are permissible under the Fourth Amendment so long as the
officer can "point to specific, articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn
from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude [the defendant] had committed
or was about to commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987)
(citations omitted).
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did
not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555-56, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877
(1980). Other circumstances that might indicate a seizure include the blocking of a person's
egress, see State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225,1228 (Utah App. 1997), retention of the person's
identification, see Ray, 2000 UT App 55, at f 13, activation of the officer's overhead
8

emergency lights, see Smith, 781 P.2d at 881-82, or removal of the person to a private area,
see Carter, 812 P.2d at 463. However, the presence of any one of these factors is not
dispositive, but must be examined in the context of all the circumstances. See United States
v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997). "[T]he crucial test is whether, taking into
account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence
and go about his business.'" Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437,111 S.Ct. at 2387 {quotingMichigan
v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1977 (1988)).
Arrests. "[A] level-two stop evolves into a level-three de facto arrest when, in view
of all the circumstances, a reasonable, innocent person in the suspect's place would believe
himself to be under arrest." State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 674 (Utah App. 1991), cert,
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). These seizures are justified only if there is "probable
cause for the officer to believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed." Salt Lake
City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996).
B.

ANALYSIS.

A review of the encounter between defendant and Officer Allred reveals no
impermissible search or seizure. No seizure occurred until, at the very earliest, Officer
Allred asked defendant to turn off the engine. Long before then reasonable suspicion existed
justifying a level-two detention.

9

1.

The Officer's Initial Approach Was a Level-One Encounter.

The circumstances surrounding Officer Alfred's encounter with defendant did not
evidence a seizure. The truck was already parked when Officer Allred approached. See R.
51:9,20. He did not park so as to block defendant's egress, nor did he activate his red and
blue flashing lights. See R. 51: 10, 20-22, 25. He turned on his take down lights to
illuminate the area. See R. 51: 21-22,25. Nothing suggests that he displayed his weapon or
commanded defendant to remain. No other officers appeared on the scene until later. R. 51:
14. In these circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that his or her liberty was
restrained, but instead would believe that the officer is simply stopping to check a solitary
vehicle in an empty parking lot. See Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. The encounter remained
consensual even after Officer Allred recognized the truck and spoke with defendant, at least
until the officer asked defendant to turn the engine off, if not later.4
In support of his claim that he was seized from the moment Officer Allred approached
him, defendant points to this Court's decision in State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App.
1997), contending that the circumstances here are nearly identical to those in Struhs. Aplt.
Brf. at 10-12. In Struhs, an officer and her partner observed the defendant drive his pickup
truck into a construction area, turn around, back up, parking next to a sign that read, "Road
Closed," and turn off his lights. Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1226. In response, the officers "drove
down the road with their lights off, stopped about one car length away from defendant's
4

The State does not concede that a seizure occurred at that point, but that issue
need not be addressed because, as explained below, reasonable suspicion existed prior to
that time.
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vehicle nose-to-nose, and turned on the police vehicle's high beam headlights and the [ ]
white 'takedown' light." Id. at 1226-27. While some similarities exist between the two
cases, the differences between the two cases are significant.
Positioning of Patrol Car. Defendant primarily relies on the positioning of Officer
Allred's patrol car in support of his claim that he was seized from the moment Officer Allred
approached him. Attempting to characterize the encounter in a manner similar to Struhs,
defendant contends that Officer Allred parked his patrol car "nose-to-nose" with his truck,
but at an angle so "that the right front of [the officer's] car was near the left front of
[defendant's] truck." Aplt. Brf. at 9. Thus, defendant argues, his "car was very nearly
blocked in by the officer's patrol car." Aplt. Brf. at 10. This contention is not supported by
the record.
Officer Allred testified that he parked in front of defendant "at about a 45 degree
angle" with the right front of his patrol car to the right front of defendant's truck, not to the
left front of the truck. R. 51: 20. Officer Allred further testified that he "did not" block the
truck in. R. 51: 10. No testimony or other evidence was introduced contradicting that
testimony. See R. 51. Accordingly, defendant's contention that "his path was clearly
blocked to a significant degree" lacks merit and is not supported by the record. See Aplt. Brf.
at 11. The circumstances here, therefore, were unlike those in Struhs where the officers
parked in front of the defendant's vehicle "nose-to-nose." Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1226.
The Approach. The manner and circumstances in which Officer Allred approached
defendant's truck is also distinguishable. In Struhs, the officers made a "stealthy approach"
11

to the defendant with their headlights turned off after observing the defendant drive into the
area. Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228. As soon as they had parked "nose-to-nose" with the
defendant's vehicle, they turned on their high beam headlights and the take down light. Id.
at 1227-28. In contrast, Officer Allred simply drove into the parking lot and up to the truck.
R. 51:10,20. Once there, he turned on the white lights so that he could readily see the truck.
See R. 51: 22, 25. In other words, unlike the case in Struhs, Officer Allred's approach of
defendant was not confrontational. See Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228. Nothing suggests that he
attempted to conceal his approach or that he activated his high beam headlights. In fact, not
until Officer Allred had parked and called in the plates to dispatch did he even notice that
anyone was in the truck. See R. 51: 11.
Moreover, whereas the officers in Struhs approached the defendant's vehicle almost
immediately after it had driven into the construction area and parked, defendant's car in this
case had been parked for a considerable time before Officer Allred approached it. Officer
Allred did not observe defendant drive into the parking lot, but first noticed the parked truck
as he performed a security check at the ballpark complex. R. 51: 9,20. He did not approach
the truck immediately, but continued his security check. R. 51: 9. Not until he completed
his check of the complex did he drive into the parking lot to check the truck. R. 51:9-10,20.
Flood Lights. Nor did use of the white take down lights render the encounter a
seizure. Although the term "take down" lights may conjure up images of a seizure, their
actual purpose and use does not. As Officer Allred explained, "take down lights are the
lights in the light bar that are like big flood lights." R. 51: 25. They thus illuminate an area
12

when it is dark. For example, they are typically used to "shine on the back window of a car
to watch the occupants." R. 51: 25. Indeed, Officer Allred did not even know that someone
was in the truck until after he turned them on. See R. 51: 10-11,21 -22. Flood lights are not
akin to a patrol vehicle's red and blue flashing lights that are typically understood as a signal
to stop. See, e .g., McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo.1999) (holding that
motorist not free to leave after police officer activated red and blue flashing lights on police
car); Lawson v. State, 707 A.2d 947, 951 (Md. App.1998) (holding that officer's use of
flashing emergency lights "was a show of authority that constituted a seizure within the
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment because it communicated to a reasonable person
that there was an intent to intrude upon [defendant's] freedom of movement"); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5(l)(a) (1998) (requiring compliance with an officer's "visual or
audible signal... to bring [the] vehicle to a stop").
While use of flood lights may be a factor in finding a seizure depending on the other
attendant circumstances and the manner in which they are used, see, e.g., Struhs, 940 P.2d
at 1228, they do not necessarily indicate a seizure. The use of flood lights to assist the officer
in viewing an area at night when approaching a vehicle is not the same as the use of red and
blue lights to indicate to a driver that he must comply with the officer's request to stop his
vehicle. In a situation like this one, where an officer approaches a parked vehicle at midnight
in a deserted parking lot, not even knowing that there are any occupants in the vehicle, it is
certainly reasonable for the officer to illuminate the scene while assessing the situation
during his initial inquiry. A reasonable person in defendant's position would not understand
13

the encounter to be a stop, but rather a reasonable inquiry of a solitary vehicle in an empty
parking lot.
2.

The Expired Registration Supplied Reasonable Suspicion.

As noted above, once Officer Allred parked his car and turned on the flood lights to
illuminate the area, he recognized the truck as one he had seen a few days earlier bearing a
California license plate with an expired 1997 registration. R. 51: 10. At this point, Officer
Allred had reasonable suspicion to believe at least that the owner was in violation of the
State's registration laws. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (holding that
"[a]n observed traffic violation gives the officer 'at the least, probable cause to believe the
citizen had committed a traffic a traffic offense"). The Motor Vehicle Act provides that "a
person may not operate and an owner may not give another person permission to operate a
motor vehicle . . . in this state unless it has been registered" in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 41la-201 (1998). While an exemption exists for vehicles "registered in another state and
owned by a nonresident of the state," Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-202(2)(a) (1998), the
registration sticker on the plate indicated that it had not been registered in California since
1997, some two years previous to the encounter here, R. 51: 10. The Act also requires Utah
registration "within 60 days of the owner establishing residency in this state." Utah Code
Ann. §41-la-202(3) (1998).
Defendant argues that Officer Allred testified that the only basis for the continued
detention was to verify the safety of anyone inside and to check for juvenile drinking or drug
usage, not to verify the registration. Aplt. Brf. at 14. Undoubtedly, that was the initial
14

purpose of the officer's inquiry, but his subsequent actions clearly evidence his decision to
investigate the registration issue as well. As soon as he recognized the truck, he called in the
license plate number to dispatch. R. 51: 10-11. He dispelled his initial concerns once he
spoke with defendant, but then asked defendant to turn off the engine because he "wanted
to talk to him more." R. 51: 11-12,23-24. In the ensuing conversation, defendant admitted
that the "license plates were expired," but claimed he had bought a temporary sticker. R. 51:
13. When the officer checked the back plate for a temporary sticker, he could not determine
whether or not it was still valid because it was too faded. R. 51: 13. His suspicion that the
vehicle was not properly registered thus remained.
Defendant also contends that reasonable suspicion could not exist based on the
officer's observation on a prior occasion. Aplt. Brf. at 14. Had it been several weeks or
months since that observation, defendant's argument may have carried some weight.
However, Officer Allred testified that it was only a "few days" earlier. R. 51:10. It was thus
reasonable for him to believe that the vehicle was yet unregistered in California. See Lopez,
873 P.2d at 1132 (holding that "as long as an officer suspects that the 'driver is violating any
one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the police officer may
legally stop the vehicle) {citingDelaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,661,99 S.Ct. 1391,1400
(1979)).5

defendant's furtive movements in the truck, together with the incidents of drug
usage in that area, also created reasonable suspicion for Officer Allred to investigate the
purpose of defendant's presence at that location and time.
15

3.

The Outstanding Warrant Justified the Arrest and Search.

During the encounter, Officer Allred initiated a warrants check. See R. 51:13. While
awaiting the check, defendant admitted that he had an outstanding warrant. R. 51: 13.
Dispatch subsequently confirmed the outstanding warrant justifying defendant's arrest. R.
51: 14. Nothing suggests that the warrants check "significantly extend[ed] the period of
detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration
and to issue a citation." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133. Indeed, the officer still had not resolved
the registration issue when defendant admitted to the outstanding warrant. See R. 51: 13.
Accordingly, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133.
Finally, the subsequent search of defendant which revealed the contraband was justified
under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Ayala,
762 P.2d 1107, 1111-12 (Utah App. 1988), cert denied, 111 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
* * *

The trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that no seizure occurred when Officer
Allred first approached defendant's truck. See R. 51: 41-42. The trial court also correctly
concluded that reasonable suspicion existed once the officer "recognized that vehicle as
being one with expired plates." R. 51: 45. The officer's subsequent actions, whether or not
a seizure actually occurred, were justified under the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

Addendum A

him, "that I have a new sticker".

The officer walks around to

investigate that, which is he should do. And from there he
finds^out that there's a warrant by the defendant's own
admission.

Clearly this can be divisional from Struhs and the

officer did nothing wrong in this instance, Your Honor. We'd
ask that the motion to suppress be denied.
THE COURT: Anything further?
All right.

Give me a second here.

COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS
THE COURT: All right.

This is the way I see it.

The officer sees a truck where a truck would not normally be.
Arguably you could use the Struhs' language and say in a high
crime area late at night, just stopped.

The specific, it's

out to the fair ground on Christmas morning at 12:40 a.m.,
which is not a logical place for a vehicle to be, and I think
that the law's pretty clear that all of that added up is not
reasonable suspicion to make a Level-2 stop when the officer
just sees it.
So the next step is that he drives up to the truck
on a 45 degree angle and illuminates the--what they call the
take down lights which are the bright lights that illuminate
the area, rather than the flashing lights that indicate that,
ah, that an officer is displaying his authority.

Urn, seems to

me that activating the lights and being parked at a 45 degree
angle in and of itself does not make a Level-2 stop at that
J. M. LIDDELL
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point, but the minute--and that might be moot because the
instant-that the officer drives up, he recognizes the vehicle
and knows he's got a violation.
Yeah.

He's got a license violation.

He saw the California plates.

He remembered it from

before and he knew that this vehicle had expired plates. So
while I'm finding that that's a Level-1 stop at that point,,
I'm also finding that if it were a Level-2 stop, he had
reasonable suspicion because he knew that that vehicle was,
ah, operating, it was running, and that it was expired--had
expired plates.

That's the way I understand the facts.

That's what he just told me on the stand.
MR. ALLRED:

But he hadn't--the testimony also was

that he hadn't checked that.

He hadn't verified it. He

doesn't know—
THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:
THE COURT:

That's right.
--he doesn't know that that's true.
That's correct.

He remembers it from

before that this vehicle had expired plates and of course, he
has an obligation to check that.

But that's reasonable

suspicion to allow him to check it.

So I'm finding that at

the point he drove up, it's still a Level-1 stop, and I'm also
finding that if it were a Level-2 stop, the fact that he knew
the instant he drove up that this is a vehicle which (1) is
operating, it's running, and (2) it's — it had expired plates
the last he knew, and I think he's entitled to use all of
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these other things, these other factors which the court has
been very clear are not enough, in and of themselves.
So he steps out and talks to the defendant and he
investigates what should logically be investigated.
do we have a suicide problem here?
problem here?
those.

And he answers no.

That is

Do we have an alcohol
He doesn't have any of

It's reasonable for him to inquire, urn, even if you

determine, which I am not, that the defendant was not free to
leave at that point.
Then, if I have the chronology right, at that point
he asks the defendant to shut off his vehicle.
move from a Level-1 to a Level-2 stop.

That begins to

However, if it were a

legitimate Level-2 stop, the officer would have either got the
defendant out of the vehicle or else he would have taken the
keys.

I mean that's just standard operating procedure. You

don't--don't leave a guy in the--anyway it seems to me that my
point here is it's not clear that it's a Level-2 stop.
The subjective reason for asking the defendant to
shut off the vehicle was so that he wouldn't leave. The
officer said that in the prelim.
it was noisy.

Today he said it was because

But I think he's--

MR. HARMOND:

I think he did say so he couldn't

leave, on cross examination, Your Honor.

He admitted that

today.
THE COURT:

So he could--cause he could hear it--so
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OFFICIAL REPORTER

PAGE

43

he could hear.
MR. HARMOND:

No.

I--I thought his testimony was

that he--he said, "I didn't want him to leave.

I wanted to

talk to him."
THE COURT:

Yeah.

And I'm--I'm assuming that either

one or the both of those are the subjective reasons of this
officer for having doing so--having required or requested, I
guess is the right verb, the defendant shut off the vehicle.
We're getting closer to a Level-2 stop, but again
we've got reasonable suspicion that this is a vehicle which
has expired plates on it, so I don't really think it matters
at this point.

Absent that, I think we'd have a problem.

So then he checks the plates.

I think that's

reasonable either under Level-1 or Level-2. And the result of
that is inconclusive.

He didn't know.

So then he goes back

to check the warrant; runs a warrant check.
reasonable.

That is likewise

Now I assume that he asked for the drivers

license at that point and when he has--and I'll put this in
the form of a question--when the officer takes the drivers
license* to his car to check it where it's a Level-2; right?
Cause you can't drive away without your drivers license.
MR. HARMOND:
THE COURT:

I think that's correct.

So I think that at that point, at least,

ah, if not-MR. HARMOND:

Defendant doesn't appear to be free to
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leave at that point.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

That's — that's my point.

So at

that-^-atr-the latest, we got to Level-2 when he asked for his
drivers license and went to run a check.

I think the totality

of the circumstances with all of the things that we've talked
about, but the salient factor being the one that the officer
already knew that this vehicle had, ah, expired plates,
justify a Level-2 warrants check at that point.

Now while

he's still waiting for the warrants check to come back, the
defendant volunteers that he's got a warrant that's later
verified and at that point I would say the volunteering--well
the volunteering is probably probable cause to arrest for past
reasonable suspicion.

But certainly to the check coming back

as having a valid warrant is probable cause to arrest.
Then we get into the search--I mean an arrest and a
search incident to arrest and the defense has said that that's
not the issue anyway.
Level-1 to Level-2?

The issue is when did we go from

And I think I've covered that.

So based

on that, I'm going to deny the motion to suppress and find
that thi» was a, ah, Level-1 stop up until requesting the
drivers license and that it became a Level-2 stop at that
point.

I'm also going to find that there was reasonable

suspicion from the point that the officer drove up to the car
and recognized that vehicle as being one with expired plates
and that therefore it is moot whether it's Level-1 or Level-2
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because the reasonable suspicion existed to do everything the
officer did up until the point of running the warrants check
and at that point it turns to probable cause and the officer
is justified to going to Level-3.

Any questions on the

ruling?
MR. ALLRED:

I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ALLRED:

If I could have--make sure I have a

finding just to--to clarify.

You're making a finding then

that the--the fact that the officer had seen the vehicle some
time ago previously that the plates were expired, that that's
reasonable articulable suspicion to go further.
THE COURT:
clear.

Yes. That--that--I'11 make this pretty

That alone is enough, and that, coupled with these

other factors, 12:40 a.m. Christmas morning out to the, ah,
rodeo grounds and all of that.

Without all of that Struhs

stuff, it's still reasonable suspicion.
MR. ALLRED:

And asking to turn off the vehicle with

the take down lights on and all the other factors that the
Court's identified is not a Level-2 stop.
THE COURT:

Ifm making that finding; and I'm also

making a finding that the reasonable suspicion on the vehicle
registration makes that point moot anyway.
findings.

I'm making both

Any other questions?
MR. ALLRED: No.
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MR. HARMOND:
THE COURT:

Nothing, Your Honor.
The motion to suppress is denied.

Where

II does that put us here?>

MR. ALLRED:

If we can set--

MR. HARMOND:
|| Honor.

1
1

This is Judge Halliday's case, Your

We need to set. it on his next calendar to set a trial.

MR. ALLRED:
THE COURT:

Pleas, Your Honor.

1

I guess for an arraignment.

1

Oh, is that what it is?

MR. ALLRED:
THE COURT:

1

Put it on for trial setting.

MR. HARMOND:
THE COURT:

1

Yeah.
Put it on for arraignment.

MR. ALLRED:

1

He would have had to have been

1

II arraigned to do the--

MR. HARMOND:

He had a preliminary hearing.

He was

|

l| bound over and then you indicated that you wanted to set a

|

|| motion to suppress.

MR. ALLRED:

Great.

Yeah.

If we could have an

I arraignment, that would be great.

MR. HARMOND:
1 agreement .

|

It doesn't have a trial setting

That's all

MR. ALLRED:

Whatever.

1

THE COURT: What's the day?

1

MR. ALLRED:

1

I show Judge Halliday's next date as

June 12 th'?
J. M. LIDDELL
OFFICIAL REPORTER

PAGE

47

CLERK:

June the 8th.

MR. ALLRED:

June the 8th?

Yeah.

MR. HARMOND:

I think that•s right.

THE COURT: Whichever.
CLERK:

Okay.

MR. ALLRED:

It's June the 8th.

Well June--I show June 8 as a--as a

Thursday.
CLERK:

June?

THE COURT:

Oh, I'm in '88--'98.

Sorry.

Let's not do that.

MR. HARMOND:

Maybe June 5th?

MR. HARMOND:

I think it's the 12th then, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

June 12th at what time?

1:00 o'clock?

Is that when the-MR. ALLRED:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ALLRED:

May I make one additional request?

The

defendant has a hold on him from the State Prison, Your Honor,
for a parole hold I guess is what you'd call it. May the
defendant remain, pending that date?
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Harmond, to having
him-MR. HARMOND:

I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Any objection to having him remain in
Carbon County, rather than going back to the prison?
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